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I. INTRODUCTION
In his column of June 2, 1966, in the Washington Post, Mr. Buch-
wald wrote the following:
Every time you pick up the newspaper you read about one
company merging with another company. Of course, we have
* This article was prepared as a background paper for a conference on "Conglomerates
and Public Policy." Its purpose is to raise questions of policy and provide some basis for
their discussion.
** Economist, Consultant, and Author and Co-Author of numerous books; e.g.,
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY; MODERN ECONOMY IN ACTION; and STRUC-
TURE OF THE AMcERCAN ECONOMY.
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laws to protect competition in the United States, but one cannot
help thinking that, if the trend continues, the whole country
will soon be merged into one large company.
It is 1978 and by this time every company west of the
Mississippi will have merged into one giant corporation known
as Samson Securities. Every company east of the Mississippi
will have merged under an umbrella corporation known as
the Delilah Company.
It is inevitable that one day the chairman of the board of
Samson and the president of Delilah would meet and discuss
merging their two companies.
"If we could get together," the president of Delilah said,
"we would be able to finance your projects and you would be
able to finance ours."
"Exactly what I was thinking," the chairman of Samson
said.
"That's a great idea and it would certainly make everyone's
life less complicated.
"But if you merge," someone pointed out, "there will be
only one company left in the United States."
"Exactly," said the president of Delilah. "Thank God for
the free enterprise system."'
This country is, of course, a long way from the final merger, but we
are also considerably closer to that event, as compared with the simple
small-enterprise economy of a hundred years ago. Needless to say, the
conglomerates, including bank conglomerates and railroad conglomerates,
are taking us headlong toward that end. In the four years preceding 1970,
nearly seven percent of the assets of all mining and manufacturing cor-
porations were merged into other corporations. At the merger rate which
took place in the first half of 1969, it would take only a score of years to
absorb most of the manufacturing assets into a couple of hundred huge
companies. The railroads and utilities are even more concentrated than
manufacturing and are not only merging further, but some railroads,
through holding companies, are becoming conglomerates. In the banking
industry, one-bank holding companies are being used to break down the
line between banking and nonbanking activity which public policy had
previously established. The long-run trend toward economic concentra-
tion has presented serious economic problems and this recent wave of
conglomerate mergers has increased the importance of these problems.
This article will first examine the available statistics on concentra-
tion, and then consideration will be given to the problems of public policy
which concentration engenders.
1. Washington Post, June 2, 1966.
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II. THE TREND ToWARD CONCENTRATION
The trend toward concentration will be considered first by going
back to a time when there was little concentration, then the several
merger movements will be discussed, and finally the statistics of concen-
tration will be examined for the manufacturing industry alone and for the
economy as a whole.
A. An Economy with Little Concentration
To find a period of slight concentration in the United States economy
it is necessary to go back only a hundred years. Just before the Civil War,
two-thirds of the labor force was engaged in agriculture. The family farm
was the usual form of organization and flexible farm prices were deter-
mined by the interaction of a large number of buyers and sellers in the
market. There were no telephone or electric power companies, and the
railroads were just beginning to be consolidated. In 1853, the New York
Central was formed by consolidating the ten short sections of railroad,
mostly end to end, which spanned the 300-mile distance between Albany
and Buffalo. At that time, according to Professor Ripley, one hundred
miles of railroad was considered to be the maximum which could be
operated efficiently.2 Most manufacturing production took place in small
local plants or in small shops. The clothing industry was just coming out
of the home with the invention of the sewing machine, and the shoe indus-
try was in the process of being brought into the factories. American iron-
masters had only recently shifted from the old method of hammering out
bar iron in a forge fired by charcoal to the newer method of rolling. The
Bessemer steel furnace, invented in 1856, had not yet been put into
practical operation, and the open-hearth furnace was still to be developed.
In that period, the United States economy was indeed an economy of
small-scale enterprise. For practical purposes, there was little concentra-
tion. Even for theoretical purposes, such concentration as existed could
be disregarded for most purposes of public policy. National economic
policy could be decided on the basis of a body of economic theory which
assumed that all production was carried on under conditions of classical
competition; that is, competition between such a large number of buyers
and sellers that no producer or buyer had significant pricing power and
prices were determined by the law of supply and demand.
This unconcentrated economy, and the classical theory based upon it,
dominated public policy through the 19th century and the first third of
the 20th century. In fact, the Sherman Act was passed in 1890 with the
aim of preserving this type of economy.
B. The Drive for Monopoly
After the Civil War, industry became increasingly important in the
economy as a whole, and toward the end of the century there was a merger
2. W. RIPLFY, RAnMADs 456 (1915).
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movement aimed, often explicitly, at obtaining monopoly control over
prices. This movement is reflected in Chart I which shows the number
of mergers year by year reported in the Commercial and Financial
Chronicle from 1895 to 1914. As can be seen, there was a burst of mergers
from 1898 to 1902. Some of the industries which were substantially
monopolized are listed below with the proportion of the market held by
the single largest producer indicated."
Proportion of industry by
largest company (%)
Cigarettes 100






This merger movement culminated in 1902 in the merger of mergers
which produced the U.S. Steel Corporation with control over two-thirds
of all steel ingot production and a higher degree of control over many
steel products. A parallel wave of concentration took place among rail-
roads, culminating in the acquisition of control of the Great Northern and
the Northern Pacific by the Northern Securities Company in 1901. The
public reaction to this merger movement was strong and the powers of the
Sherman Act were brought to bear. First, the Northern Securities5 deci-
sion by the Supreme Court in 1904 outlawed the holding company as a
device for achieving monopoly. Then other court decisions brought the
break-up of monopolies in manufacturing, such as the Standard Oil
Company and the American Tobacco Company. Still other merged enter-
prises failed to achieve or retain monopoly under the new attitudes of the
public and the court decisions, and thus the rate of mergers dropped back
to a low level as is indicated in Chart .6 In this manner, the first great
wave of mergers was not only halted but turned back so that big monopoly
as such was largely eliminated and there was probably less concentration
in manufacturing by the beginning of the First World War than there was
in 1902.
C. The Drive for Bigness
A second wave of mergers occurred in the decade after the First
World War, reaching its peak in 1929. In this period, the drive behind
3. See APPENDIX, p. 36 infra.
4. J. Fred Weston, Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly oj the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I
at 140 (1964).
5. Northern Securities v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
6. See APPENDix, p. 36 infra.
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the merger movement was clearly not a drive for monopoly but a drive
for bigness. To what extent this was a drive for market power, as con-
trasted to an attempt to gain productive efficiency, has been hotly debated
and is an unsettled issue. This issue has been confused by the frequent use
of profit rates as a measure of productive efficiency even though profits
could also be a measure of market power.
The merger movement in manufacturing and mining from 1919 to
1939 is shown in Chart II. The figures in this chart represent a counting
of mergers more complete than that of Chart I so that the absolute number
of mergers cannot be compared but the story is the same; a short period
of very high merger rates followed by a period of low rates.
In this same period, an even more vigorous wave of mergers occurred
among public utilities, as great numbers of independent local utilities
were brought under a single control. This wave was not only brought to
a halt by popular reaction but there was also some break-up under the
Holding Company Act of 1935.
Mergers among railroads were largely prevented by the I.C.C., but
stock acquisitions in the 1920's continued to bring many railroads closer
together.
Altogether, the decade of the 1920's was one of mergers which con-
tributed to concentration, while the post depression decade was the re-
verse. In the latter period, government stood ready to apply its antitrust
powers against mergers and its other powers against holding companies.
Mergers in the manufacturing and mining field from 1935 to 1939
averaged just over one hundred a year, as compared to an average of over
1000 a year from 1926 to 1929.
D. The Conglomerate Drive
The third major wave of mergers, which took the primary form of
creating huge conglomerates, has only recently been brought to a halt by
a decline in the stock market and a concomitant drop in the value of
many conglomerates. Chart III8 shows, for each year since 1948, the
number of mergers of manufacturing and mining firms in which the ac-
quired firm had assets of $10 million or more. From 1948 to 1952, the
annual rate of big mergers was 7 a year. From 1953 through 1966, the
annual rate was 70 a year. In the last three years, the annual rate of big
mergers has been over 165 a year with $30 billion of assets thereby ac-
quired by other companies. This represents around 7 percent of the assets
of all manufacturing and mining corporations and a much larger percent-
age of the assets of corporations not included in the 200 largest.
The current merger movement has also affected other fields. Dr.
Mueller, Economist for the Federal Trade Commission, recently made
the following statement to a Congressional Committee:
7. See APPENDIX, p. 37 infra.
8. See APPENDIX, p. 38 infra.
1970]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
mergers in wholesale and retail trade, services and miscellaneous
industries have risen even more rapidly than have mergers in
manufacturing and mining. Moreover, in recent years, railroads
not only have been merging with one another but increasingly
have absorbed manufacturing and other concerns through newly
created holding companies. Mergers also are occurring with
increasing frequency in other areas of transportation as well
as in the utility and broadcasting industries. Most recently one-
bank holding companies have been formed by many large banks
for the purpose of expanding the scope of these institutions and,
in some cases, absorbing business enterprises outside banking.'
This wave of mergers has tended to be increasingly a matter of
conglomerate mergers. The FTC classes as conglomerate 80 percent of
the substantial manufacturing and mining mergers of the last five years
and 89 percent of those occurring last year.10 Of course, the acquisition
of industrial companies by railroad and bank holding companies creates
conglomerates. This is in sharp contrast to the merger wave at the turn
of the century, when the focus was on horizontal mergers aimed at
achieving monopoly, and also with the second wave which sought bigness
and market control mostly through vertical and some horizontal mergers
within the limits of the antitrust acts. Whether the antitrust acts place
significant limits on conglomerate mergers remains to be seen.
E. The Underlying Trend toward Concentration in the Economy
It is clear that there has been an underlying trend toward making the
United States economy more concentrated. The small enterprise economy
of a hundred years ago has given place to the modern economy of big
business. The questions are, how fast has this increase in concentration
been taking place, and how far has it actually carried?
To answer these questions it is necessary to consider the various
sources of concentration. Mergers have contributed a spectacular part to
the increasing concentration. However, there have been other develop-
ments contributing to concentration. Perhaps, even more important than
mergers is the shift from a predominantly agricultural to an industrial
economy. In the earlier period, two-thirds of the gainfully employed
persons were in agriculture. Today less than 5 percent of the gainfully
employed are in an agricultural industry in which nearly two-thirds of
farm marketings are still made by family farms." Today, the major
proportion of employment is in industry where large units prevail. This
9. W. Mueller, Hearing on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Anti-
trust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969).
10. Id. at 7a, fig. 2. "Substantial mergers" include all mergers in which the acquired
corporation had assets of $10 million or more.
11. In 1964, 64 percent of the value of farm marketings were made by family farms,
i.e., farms employing no more than one hired worker (or the equivalent) per year, up
from 63 percent in 1959.
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shift alone without any mergers would have greatly increased concentra-
tion for the economy as a whole.
Another source of concentration is the internal growth of single
enterprises. For example, the assets of the American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company have increased 275 percent in the last 16 years, primarily
from internal growth, and much faster than the assets of all nonfinancial
corporations. The increase in concentration from this source is more
difficult to measure because a company can choose between expansion by
merger and expansion by internal growth. This complicates the determina-
tion of concentration since corporations classed as the largest in any year
will depend on a combination of the two.
In measuring concentration, account must also be taken of the
increased proportion of industry and trade which is carried on by corpora-
tions. A hundred years ago, there were relatively few industrial corpo-
rations. To illustrate, in Pittsburgh in 1860 there were 17 foundries, 21
rolling mills, 76 glass factories, and 47 other manufactories, but not a
single one was incorporated. Only in the early New England cotton indus-
try were corporate enterprises a significant factor. By 1900 only two-thirds
of manufacturing was incorporated, while today over 99 percent is in-
corporated. 12 Trade and services were still largely unincorporated in
1900, while today two-thirds of retail sales are made by incorporated
enterprise.13 Thus, as the proportion of corporate enterprise which is
carried on by a few enterprises increases, the proportion of all enterprise
carried on by the few corporations increases even faster.
F. Overall Concentration in Manufacturing
The most comprehensive data on concentration is in the field of
manufacturing. Reasonably reliable data is available on the proportion
of corporate assets controlled by the hundred largest manufacturing cor-
porations in 1929 and at intervals from 1950 onward for both the 100
largest and the 200 largest. Chart IV 14 shows the proportion of all manu-
facturing corporation assets and the corresponding proportion of net
capital assets (land, buildings and equipment) controlled by the 100
largest manufacturing corporations in each year since 1947.
As can be seen from Chart IV, the hundred largest manufacturing
corporations in 1929 controlled 40 percent of the total assets of all manu-
facturing corporations."0 By 1962, the hundred largest manufacturing
companies controlled nearly half the assets of all manufacturing corpora-
12. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS Or THE UNITED STATES 413 (1960)
(for 1900 measured by value of products in 1899).
13. STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS FOR THE UNITED STATES (1969).
14. See APPENDIX, p. 39 infra.
15. Id.
16. Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 18 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
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tions. In 1969, the preliminary estimates suggested that 100 manufac-
turing corporations controlled 52 percent of all manufacturing corporation
assets.
More important than concentration of total assets is the concentra-
tion in net capital assets; the land, buildings, and equipment which provide
the material basis for production and, along with business organization,
give a corporation its market power. In 1929, the hundred largest manu-
facturing corporations controlled 44 percent of all manufacturing corpo-
rate assets, and by 1952 or 1953, the hundred largest corporations of that
year controlled 50 percent of the net capital assets of all manufac-
turing corporations. Today the hundred largest corporations control
approximately 62 percent of the net capital assets of all manufacturing
corporations.17
17. See G. NUTTER, EXTENT OF ENTERPRISE MONOPOLY IN THE UNITED STATES (1951);
Adelman, The Measurement of Industrial Concentration, 33 REv. op EcoN. & STATISTICS
287 (1951).
The Nutter monograph is concerned with the relative importance of monopoly and
concentration in relation to the market; rather than overall concentration. It attempts to
measure market concentration around 1900 and again in 1937. It concludes that there
was somewhat less monopoly in the latter year than at the turn of the century.
This conclusion depends in part on a peculiar definition of monopoly, which includes
railroads as a monopolized industry in 1900 and as a competitive industry in 1937. A
more practical definition which treated railroads as regulated monopolies in both periods
would have reversed the finding and shown an increase in monopoly even under Nutter's
definition of monopoly for other activities. The subjective character of Nutter's other
classifications has also been brought out in Lebergott's criticisms. See Lebergott, Senate
Hearings, supra note 16, at 343. See also G. Nutter, Senate Hearings, supra note 16, at 345.
Nutter's questionable finding has often been treated as a finding that overall con-
centration declined in this period. But there is nothing inconsistent between a decline in
monopoly, which is concerned with concentration in the market, and an increase in overall
concentration. If a steel company acquires a structural steel fabricating company, this may
add to overall concentration, but it does not alter the degree of concentration in the pro-
duction of steel. If an automobile company adds electric refrigerators and railway locomo-
tives to its activity, market concentration may go down while overall concentration goes up.
Whether overall concentration in manufacturing, or for the economy as a whole, occurred
between 1900 and 1937 cannot be deduced from the Nutter analysis. The question of con-
centration in relation to the market will be examined in a later section when competition
is being discussed.
The second monograph by Adelman, purports to show among other things, that there
has been no tendency for concentration to increase from 1931 to 1947. But the analysis is
so crude that the estimates have no significance for the following reasons.
First, the depression year, 1931, is used as the base of measurement, in spite of the
fact that the assets of the 200 largest nonfinancial corporations had increased 3 percent
from 1929 to 1931 while the assets of all other nonfinancial corporations had shrink 24
percent in the two years of depression. Senate Hearings, supra note 16 at 311. Clearly a
depression year is unsuitable as a base.
Second, Adelman uses unadjusted Treasury figures with no attempt to adjust or even
discuss the important changes in the basis of competition, with no adjustment for the
serious under-consolidation of subsidiaries which changed markedly over the period, with
no adjustment or mention of the double counting of assets which arises from the holding
by one corporation of the stocks of another which it does not control, and with no attempt
to deal with net capital assets which involve no duplication and are more fundamental to
the problem of overall concentration.
Third, Adelman disregarded completely the most reliable estimates of concentration
available for a nondepression year, those for 1929, which were made directly from tax
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Besides the foregoing, there are other means of measuring concentra-
tion. If the proportion of manufacturing corporation profits made by the
hundred largest manufacturing corporations were used, the degree of
concentration shown would be greater. The big corporations not only tend
to use more capital per worker, but also tend to obtain a higher rate of
return. If "value added" or "workers employed" were used to measure
concentration, the degree of concentration would be substantially less.
Figures for total assets and net capital assets have been given here because
of the power that arises from concentrated assets.
The assets of the second hundred largest manufacturing corporations
in the respective years have also been increasing more rapidly than the
assets of all manufacturing corporations. In 1950, the second largest
hundred controlled approximately 8.7 percent of the assets of all manu-
facturing corporations, and in 1962 this figure increased to 9.3 percent.18
Only crude estimates for 1969 are available but they suggest that the
second hundred in that year controlled at least 10 percent. Adding these
percentages to the more reliable figures for the largest hundred suggests
the following conclusions: the largest 200 manufacturing corporations in
1950 controlled nearly 52 percent of all manufacturing corporation assets;
the 200 largest in 1962 controlled 58 percent; and the 200 largest in
1969 controlled 61 percent. In terms of the more important figures of
capital assets, (land, buildings, and equipment) the proportion controlled
by the 200 largest manufacturing corporations in the respective years
rose from around 57 percent in 1950 to around 66 percent in 1962, and
eventually to nearly 70 percent at the present time.' 9
The rate of increasing concentration for manufacturing as a whole,
including unincorporated manufacturing, is somewhat greater than these
figures suggest. In 1950, over 5 percent of manufacturing assets were held
by entities other than corporations, while today barely one percent of
manufacturing assets are unincorporated. Thus, the proportion of all
manufacturing assets controlled by the largest 200 corporations in the
respective years has gone from just under 50 percent in 1950 to just over
60 percent in 1969, and net capital assets of all manufacturing enterprises
returns of the larger corporations with reasonable complete consolidation of all legally
controlled companies. See Senate Hearings, supra note 16, at 287.
Finally, Adelman's general findings are at direct variance with the findings of others,
including the staff of the Federal Trade Commission, the staff of the Senate Antitrust
Committee, and my own.
For a more detailed critique of Adelman's estimates see G. MEANS, ThOUHTS ON
CONCENTRATION, PROCEEDINGS Or THE BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC SECTION OF THE AMERICAN
STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION 123-26 (1962).
Professor Adelman presented similar figures with essentially the same flaws, covering
the period from 1931 to 1960, to the Senate Committee on Antitrust and Monopoly. They
show no attempt to meet the above criticisms. Senate Hearings, supra note 16, at 234-40.
18. Senate Hearings, supra note 16, at 121.
19. Estimates made by the author on the basis of reliable data given above for the
largest 100 manufacturing corporations plus crude estimates for the second hundred largest
form the basis for these figures.
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controlled by the largest 200 corporations have risen from 55 percent in
1950 to more than 70 percent in 1969.
A simple extrapolation of the increase in concentration of the last
score of years to the year 2000 would give a figure of 92.5 percent as the
proportion of net manufacturing capital assets controlled by 200 corpo-
rations. If the recent more rapid rate of concentration were to continue,
this high degree of manufacturing concentration would come much sooner.
Effective enforcement of the antitrust acts could prevent any final merger
and could slow up the increasing concentration, but how effective it can
be will depend to an important extent on the treatment of conglomerates.
G. Concentration for the Economy as a Whole
The most reliable figures for concentration in the economy as a
whole are those for 1929. In that year, 200 corporations controlled 48
percent of the assets of all nonfinancial corporations, including not only
manufacturing but also transportation, trade, and service corporations.
These same 200 corporations also controlled 58 percent of the net capital
assets of all nonfinancial corporations."0
Since 1929, no adequate statistical study of concentration by all non-
financial corporations has been made. We have seen the increase in
manufacturing concentration. Big railroad mergers such as the Penn-
Central and the Norfolk-Nickel Plate mergers have clearly increased
railroad concentration, while air transportation is carried on in large part
by huge air transport companies. The chain supermarket and other chain-
stores have increased in relative importance. But until a competent study
of corporate concentration has been made, it is not possible to state with
certainty how much the concentration for nonfinancial corporations as a
whole has increased, although it is relatively certain that it has not de-
creased. It is concentration in the economy as a whole as well as concen-
tration in manufacturing which pose the problems of public policy arising
from concentration which will be discussed in the next part of this paper.
III. PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC POLICY CREATED BY CONCENTRATION
The shift of the U.S. economy from one predominantly characterized
by small scale enterprise to one made up predominantly of big corporate
enterprise has created problems of public policy with which the society
is only beginning to grapple. In this article, some of the more important
problems will be considered under three headings. First, consideration
will be given to three related problems created by concentration which
affect the economy as a whole-unemployment, inflation, and the balance
of international payments. Second, attention will be given to the changed
character of competition and the resulting effects both on the way re-
sources are used and on the distribution of income. And, finally, attention
20. G. Mms, TE STRUCTURE OF Tim AMEiRCw EcoNoMy 107 (1939).
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will be given to the welfare of the people who live and work in an economy
of big business enterprises and experience both its affluence and its
effluence.
A. Employment, Inflation, and the Balance
of Payments
The economists of the 19th century did a brilliant job of analyzing
how a world economy made up of individual buyers and sellers and of
small business enterprises could be expected to operate. They concluded
that, in such an economy, the working of the market mechanism in which
supply and demand were equated by price would automatically prevent
excessive unemployment, would automatically prevent serious inflation
in the absence of monetary manipulation, and, under the gold standard,
would automatically maintain a reasonable balance in international pay-
ments. For such an economy, the appropriate policy of government was
one of laissez-faire so far as employment, inflation, and the balance of
payments were concerned. In these three fields, the function of government
was met when each government assured sound stocks of money directly
related to the monetary stock of gold in that country and maintained a
free flow of gold with other countries.
The automatic mechanisms by which full employment would be main-
tained, inflation avoided, and international payments kept in balance all
depended on a very high degree of price flexibility and the determination
of price by supply and demand. It required a degree of competition among
such a large number of buyers and sellers that no single buyer or seller
had any power to choose to buy or sell currently at one price rather than
another. The individual seller could either sell at the market, as shares are
sold in today's stock market, or could hold off selling in the hope of a price
rise. A seller could not have a price policy: he could not set a price for a
type of product and expect a series of sales at that price over a period of
time. The same applies to buyers.
Today, the great bulk of commodities are sold at prices which are set
for periods of time and involve a series of transactions. Such prices, which
have been called administered prices in contrast to the market prices of
19th century theory, reflect some degree of market power-the power to
set one price rather than another.
A monopoly can, of course, set its price and is likely to adopt price
administration as its procedure in marketing. Regulated monopoly usually
operates with prices administered by the interaction of the seller and a
government commission. The government itself operates with administered
prices as in the case of postal rates which are set by Congress for periods
of time. With monopoly, administered prices are to be expected.
However, price administration is also the normal marketing proce-
dure where competition is active but sellers are few. The prices of standard
steel products are set for periods of time and revised from time to time
1970]
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with set differentials for different special characteristics, and the bulk of
steel transactions take place at these fixed prices. Although supply and
demand influence steel prices, they do not determine them. The determina-
tion is a matter of the administrative decision of single companies in the
light of supply and demand conditions, usually with the behavior or antici-
pated behavior of specific recognized competitors in mind.
This type of pricing is essential for modern, efficient industry, and
with the increased concentration in the economy, it has become so much
the normal pricing method that the great bulk of commodity and service
transactions take place at administered prices. Concentration has also led
to the administration of wage rates either by management, as was true of
the heavy industries before 1933, or by negotiated agreements between
management and organized labor. Thus, instead of economy with flexible
prices set predominately in a free market, as 19th century theory assumed,
we have an economy in which prices are administered and are inflexible,
at least for short periods of time. In the next section, the effect of price
administration on the use of resources and income distribution will be
considered. Here, the immediate concern is the relation between price
administration and employment, inflation, and the balance of payments.
As will be seen, even a very moderate degree of market power, which al-
lows price administration, if widespread, can prevent the operation of the
three automatic mechanisms relied on in the policies inherited from the
19th century. In the following text, each of these automatic mechanisms
will be outlined as they apply to an economy of market prices, then the
distortion resulting from price administration will be indicated, and finally,
the problem thereby created will be discussed.
B. The Classical Theory of Employment Adjustment and a
Concentrated Economy
It was a conclusion of the 19th century theorists that the market
mechanism would automatically tend to produce full employment, i.e., that
general overproduction or underemployment would automatically be cor-
rected through price-level adjustment.21 The operation of this classical
mechanism is quite simple. If there were a recession involving excessive
unemployment, prices would fall because of the decline in demand for
goods and wage rates would decline because of the competition of workers
for jobs. With prices and wage rates falling together, the recession, how-
ever, would not be corrected. But the fall in the price-wage level would
increase the real buying power of each unit of money. If the nominal stock
21. Keynes indicates that the classical economists assumed full employment and that
their theory "is best regarded as a theory of distribution in conditions of full employment."
J. KEYNES, GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 16 (1936). See also
Id. at 6. As a result he presents no argument to show that the classical mechanism could
not be expected to work under the flexible market-price conditions they assumed or that
the introduction of liquidity preference to the flexible market-price economy would inhibit
the working of the classical corrective mechanism,
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of money remained constant, its real buying power would increase, and
soon the public would find itself with larger cash balances than they would
choose to hold-in Ricardo's terms, money would become redundant. The
public's effort to spend the extra money would create the extra demand
necessary to absorb the involuntarily unemployed. Thus, in theory, any
recession would be quickly and automatically corrected by a general ad-
justment in the price-wage level, provided the stock of money was not
allowed to shrink as fast as the fall in price level. According to this theory,
recovery from an initial recession would be "just around the corner."
It is difficult to see why this adjustment mechanism would not work,
if prices and wage rates were perfectly flexible or even highly flexible. The
price-wage level would constantly be fluctuating down or up to correct any
tendency toward underemployment or overemployment, and the relatively
quick correction would prevent any movement one way or the other from
gaining such momentum that a general expectation of further fall (or rise)
might affect the process. This cybernetic mechanism would operate to pro-
duce reasonable stability at full employment.
It is equally obvious that, if all prices and wage rates were admin-
istered and inflexible, this mechanism would not work. An initial shrinkage
in aggregate demand would produce a decline in the employment of both
men and machines and there would be no automatic correction.
In the early 1930's, when agricultural prices and wage rates filled the
classical requirement for market prices, while most industrial prices other
than raw materials were administered, the recession brought a continuing
decline in agricultural prices and wages to farm labor but not a comparable
decline in industrial prices and industrial wage rates. In agriculture, the
initial shrinkage in aggregate demand followed the classical pattern of
falling prices and no shrinkage in farm employment. In industry, on the
other hand, the primary effect of the fall in demand was a fall in employ-
ment with the consequent further fall in aggregate demand. Under such
conditions, with the nominal money stock constant, the only condition of
short run equilibrium resulting from an initial recession would be one of
low agricultural prices and low employment in industry. The 19th century
theory of an automatic correction simply would not apply.
Today, there is general agreement among economists that there is no
automatic correction for excessive unemployment. There is also general
agreement that aggregate demand can be increased through government's
monetary and fiscal policies. The Employment Act of 1946 placed on gov-
ernment the responsibility for maintaining the aggregate demand neces-
sary for full employment, but there is still a conflict among economists as
to the reasons for the failure of a laissez-faire policy and as to the role of
money in altering aggregate demand. Does money only affect aggregate
demand through interest rates as Keynes held, or does it also operate di-
rectly on demand as experience since World War II would seem to indi-
cate? In either case, monetary and fiscal instruments for maintaining the
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desired level of aggregate demand have not yet been designed to play the
new role which is now assigned to them. Thus, the first policy problem
created by concentration has been recognized and the outlines of the new
policy have been accepted. However, effective practice for maintaining
the necessary aggregate demand remains a problem. What should be the
relative role of monetary policy and of fiscal policy? What changes, if any,
are needed in monetary and fiscal institutions in order to carry out these
policies designed to maintain full employment?
C. Classical Inflation and a Concentrated Economy
According to 19th century theory, only one source of inflation was
possible-that arising from too much money chasing too few goods; a type
of inflation which is properly called demand inflation. If the initial condi-
tion of an economy were one of full employment and the money stock were
increased in excess of that amount of its wealth the public would choose
to hold in the form of money at the initial price level; money would be-
come redundant and aggregate demand would increase, which would bring
about a rise in prices and wage rates. This type of inflation could be ex-
pected to continue as long as the stock of money continued to be greater
than the public chose to hold. It could be converted into run-away inflation
if the public as a whole came to expect rising prices and therefore chose to
reduce still further its money holdings. In the absence of run-away infla-
tion, the inflation arising from an initial excess in the stock of money
would automatically be corrected by the reduced real value of each unit
of money as the price level rose. Thus, a small rise in the money stock in
excess of the money the public would choose to hold could be expected to
lead to only a moderate price rise with no further repercussion. Also, such
an inflationary rise in prices could not, in theory, occur except under con-
ditions of full employment.
In a concentrated economy with the bulk of prices and wage rates
administered, a quite different kind of inflation is possible and it can arise
even when employment is considerably below the level considered to be
full employment. This type of inflation results from a somewhat arbitrary
exercise of market power. In an industry where competitors are few, the
exact level of prices is by no means determinate, even though firms are in
active competition with each other. There is usually some pricing discre-
tion on the part of a price leader. Even with no change in demand or costs,
an enterprise may seek to widen its profit margin by a small price increase
and be followed by others in the industry. This type of price increase could
occur in many industries, and if sufficiently general, could lead to both a
rise in the general level of prices and in unemployment. Meanwhile, the
rise in price level would provide labor with a basis for a legitimate de-
mand for higher wage rates, the granting of which would in turn reduce
profit margins. The result of the arbitrary price increases could thus be
to increase unemployment without changing the level of profit margins.
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Then, if government brings about an increase in aggregate demand in
order to absorb the new unemployment, conditions would be established
for another arbitrary rise in prices and the process could be repeated.
This type of "administrative inflation" could also be created by labor
pressure to force wage rates up faster than the increases in national pro-
ductivity. An excessive rise in wage rates would provide a legitimate basis
for price increases. Because of the increase in costs, the rise in prices could
be used to justify further wage increases.
It is clear that such an administrative inflation can occur even though
there is extensive unemployment. Thus, in the period from 1953 to 1959,
the wholesale price index rose 8.5 percent, even though unemployment
throughout the period averaged 4.8 percent of the civilian labor force.
During this period, an index dominated by flexible market prices showed
no important change, being lower in 1959 than in 1953.22 The rise in the
wholesale price index in this period was almost entirely in the more con-
centrated industries. It was triggered by rising steel prices and appears to
have resulted primarily from an effort to widen steel profit margins, which
were already ample, and only in a minor degree from a legitimate reaction
to increasing costs.23 This same phenomenon has been occurring in 1970
with recession and inflation at the same time: a development which simply
could not occur under conditions of classical competition.
There is considerable evidence that as full employment is approached,
the likelihood of administrative inflation, the arbitrary increasing of prices
or wage rates or both, also increases. Thus, if just that degree of aggregate
demand needed to support full employment were maintained, an initial
situation of stability could be expected to shift into administrative infla-
tion. Whether triggered by management or labor, the price rise with no
further increase in aggregate demand would generate unemployment.
Thus, the problem of preventing inflation not only requires techniques and
institutions for preventing excessive demand, but also techniques and in-
stitutions for preventing administrative inflation. Both the problems of
maintaining full employment and the problems of preventing inflation are
complicated, and in turn, they complicate the problem of maintaining a
balance in international payments.
D. The Classical Theory of Trade Adjustment and a Concentrated
Economy
According to classical theory, payments between countries which
were on the gold standard would automatically be maintained in reason-
able balance. The mechanism maintaining balance was beautifully simple
in principle, and under the market-price conditions assumed in classical
22. Source for wholesale price index and unemployment is EcoNoMIc REPORT OP THE
PRESMENT 252, 282 (1969); source for flexible market prices is G. MEAs, PaIcING PowER
AN THE PUBuc INTEREST 63 (1962) [hereinafter cited as PRicNo].
23. See PRICING, supra note 22, at 112-50.
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theory, there is no reason to think that it would not work as theory indi-
cated. In fact, it did work throughout much of the 19th century.
Under the gold standard, if one country had an unfavorable balance
with the rest of the gold standard countries because it was buying more
from abroad than it was selling, it would pay the difference in gold. Since
under the gold standard, the quantity of money in a country was directly
related to the country's monetary gold holdings, the money stock of the
gold-losing country would contract, thereby reducing aggregate demand.
With all prices and wage rates assumed to be highly flexible market prices,
the country's price-wage level would fall, thus encouraging other gold-
standard countries to buy from it. Simultaneously, the money stock in the
gold-receiving countries would increase, thereby expanding aggregate de-
mand. Since prices and wage rates were assumed to be highly flexible, the
price-wage levels would rise, thereby discouraging the gold-losing country
from buying from them. Thus, the gold-losing country would buy less from
abroad and sell more abroad while the gold-receiving country would do the
opposite. The gold flow and price-wage changes resulting from these
purchases could be expected to continue until the unbalance in payments
disappeared.
Of course, such an automatic mechanism could not be expected to
operate in a concentrated economy. If a concentrated country had its
money stock directly related to its monetary gold and an adverse balance
in payments arose, the outflow of gold and the contraction in its stock of
money would reduce aggregate demand as classical theory prescribed. But,
in the presence of inflexible administered prices and wage rates, the fall in
demand would create unemployment. Even though some market prices
fell, the incomes in the country would shrink until it was unable to buy as
much abroad. Simultaneously, the gold-receiving countries, if concentrated,
would experience a boom and with increased incomes would be buying
more from the depressed country. Thus, the unbalance in payments would
automatically be corrected as the gold-losing country bought less and sold
more abroad. However, the automatic adjustment would have been brought
about by a depression in one country and a boom in others, instead of
through changes in relative price-wage levels.
In practice, the gold standard was abandoned in country after country
during the first part of the 20th century, presumably because it was work-
ing progressively worse as the industrial countries became more concen-
trated and prices and wage rates became less flexible. In place of the gold
standard, under which the money supply of a country expands or contracts
in line with the country's monetary supply of gold, the central banks fo-
cused monetary policy on the problems of maintaining internal employ-
ment and price-wage stability. Inbalances in external payments have thus
become a chronic problem, sometimes for one group of countries, some-
times for another. Concentration has made the old gold standard unaccept-
able. Various measures have been adopted for postponing the need for
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correcting an unbalance in payments in the hope that by good fortune it
will disappear. Nevertheless, there is no automatic corrective. Can tech-
niques be found for correcting unbalances in international payments with-
out subjecting particular countries to depression or boom and without the
strains of drastic devaluation and revaluations?
Here we have three major and interrelated sets of problems arising
from the effects of concentration which involve the economy as a whole.
Until these are satisfactorily solved, the more specific problems of com-
petition, use of resources, and the determinants of income, though impor-
tant, will be more difficult to solve in a satisfactory fashion.
E. Competition, the Use of Resources, and Income Distribution
At the time the Sherman Act was passed, two basic market concepts
dominated economic thinking, "competition" and "monopoly." The act
was aimed to preserve the first and to prevent or eliminate the second. So
long as there was competition, it was assumed that prices were determined
by supply and demand or what can be called "classical competition." The
act was expected not only to eliminate monopoly outside of regulated
industries, but also to maintain or to reestablish classical competition.
It was not until three studies appeared in 1933-35, one concerned with
imperfect competition, one with monopolistic competition, and one with
administered prices, that nonclassical competition entered into general
economic theory. The first two of these studies pointed to the theoretical
possibility that active competition between a few companies could be
expected to produce pricing results quite different from those to be ex-
pected from classical competition. The third study indicated the preva-
lence in the American economy of prices which are clearly competitive but
which do not behave at all as prices could be expected to behave under
conditions of classical competition. As already indicated, most of Ameri-
can industry operates with administered prices. This means that, where
competitive, they operate under a condition of the newly recognized type
of competition, which will hereafter be referred to as "administrative
competition."24
When one looks at the successes and failures of the antitrust legisla-
tion, keeping in mind these three concepts-classical competition, admin-
istrative competition, and monopoly-two things stand out.
First, operations under this legislation have been outstandingly suc-
cessful in preventing industrial monopoly. Today, there is no major un-
regulated industry in which there is only one significant company. In
practically every industry, there are three or four or more companies
actively competing with each other. There may be some instances of price
24. The designations, "imperfect competition" and "monopolistic competition" are re-
jected here, partly because classical competition was probably never "perfect" as that has
been defined nor does the newly recognized type of competition involve monopoly, and
partly because the theoretical analysis of business behavior presented under these heads
does not appear to apply to most actual business behavior.
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collusion, but the legislation provides the basis for dealing with them as
was done for example in the case of price-fixing in electrical equipment.
Preventing monopoly is a never-ending task for the agencies enforcing the
antitrust laws, but action under the antitrust laws has eliminated the
industrial monopolies which developed at the turn of the century and has
prevented their recurrence on any major scale.
On the other hand, the antitrust laws have been a complete failure
in preserving classical competition. The Sherman Act seems to have been
written in the belief that, if monopoly were prevented, competition in the
classical sense would be maintained. This confusion of competition with
classical competition means that no attention was given to administrative
competition, therefore, the tradition was established that somehow the
prevention of monopoly would be sufficient to maintain the full benefits
of classical competition.
The difference in the results to be expected from the two different
types of competition are complex and not widely understood. To bring
out the most important difference, it is necessary to go back to first prin-
ciples and simplified cases. Here, the results to be expected from classical
competition will be outlined first, and then those to be expected from ad-
ministrative competition will be considered.
F. The Results to be Expected from Classical Competition
The theory of classical competition is well-established, and there is
much evidence that where the conditions for this type of competition
exist, the actual results tend to confirm the theory. The best examples of
classical competition are in agriculture. The individual wheat farmer is
competing with such a large number of other wheat farmers that his own
decision to plant more or fewer acres of wheat or to produce one kind of
wheat rather than another will not significantly alter the prices of the
different grades of wheat. He has no market power. He is a price accepter.
He can make his production and marketing decisions on the basis on what
he expects prices will be without taking into account the effect of his own
decisions on prices. This is the key difference between classical competi-
tion and administrative competition. In the latter, the producer does have
to take into account the effect of his own production policy on price, or,
more often, he has his own price policy.
We could examine the results of this type of competition in terms of
wheat or cotton or tobacco production. However, it is difficult to imagine
a comparative condition in which all, or practically all, wheat is produced
by one or the other of "the big four" or "the big six" wheat producers.
For this reason, a simplified example will be taken from the textile indus-
try where it is possible to imagine a condition of classical competition and
to compare it with a possible condition of administrative competition.
For the analysis of classical competition, assume that there are 400
cotton spinning mills: each is able to make every standard type and count
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of cotton yarn; each is separately owned and operated; each buys its cot-
ton in the competitive cotton market; each sells its output in a cotton yarn
market; and each draws its labor from an area without union organization
but in which wage rates are fairly uniform for all employers. We can
assume that some of the mills are relatively new, others are old, some are
efficiently run, others are poorly run, and that production costs will be
different for different mills. Also, assume that at the outset, some mills are
shut down and others are operating.
For the management of a closed mill, a decision must be made whether
to open. The central calculus could be expected to turn on the current and
expected price of yarns, the price of cotton, the availability and cost of
labor, and the cost of other production factors making up the operating
cost of the mill. If there were a sufficient margin between the out-of-pocket
costs of operating the mill and the in-pocket revenue to be expected, the
mill would presumably be opened and add its output to the total supply
of yarn available in the market.
There are two characteristics of this calculus which should be noticed.
First, it does not take into account the past capital cost of the mill itself.
The owner already has the mill. Unless he sells it or operates it, he will
presumably derive no revenue from it. If he can operate it and derive some
revenue in excess of his out-of-pocket costs, he would be better off than
if he kept it closed. Thus, the decision to operate or not to operate an
existing mill would turn primarily on future costs and rest not at all on
what was paid in the past for the mill itself. In the calculus to operate
or not, the capital cost of the existing mill would be "water over the dam."
The second characteristic of this calculus is that the decision would
turn only on whether to keep the mill closed or operate it at capacity.
There would be no question of operating part-time or at a low rate in
order not to flood the market or because of insufficient orders. Under the
condition of classical competition, the owner could sell all the yarn he
could make within the capacity of his mill without significantly affecting
prices. The exact capacity of his mill would, of course, vary with the type
of yarn he chose to make and on relative prices. But once the decision to
open was made, there would be no holding back production because of
the effect such holding back might have on price.
In considering whether to close an operating mill, the same type of
calculus would apply. Were out-of-pocket costs being covered by revenue
when operating at capacity? If they were, operating at capacity would
presumably be continued.
Under these conditions, and with this type of calculus, one could
expect that the more efficient mills would be open with each operating at
capacity and the less efficient would be closed. The supply of yarn flowing
into the market would meet the market demand and yarn prices would
adjust to just clear the market. If demand increased, prices would rise
relative to costs and more mills would have an inducement to operate. A
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fall in demand would reduce prices, providing some mills an inducement
to close. Thus, so long as we consider only the 400 mills, the supply would
vary with price as more or fewer mills were operated, each at capacity,
and demand and supply would be kept in line by changes in prices.
The cost of capital would enter into the market process primarily
through the decisions to build new mills. It is obvious that simply a margin
of revenue over out-of-pocket costs would not provide an inducement to
build new mills. A potential new producer would have to have a reasonable
prospect not only of recovering his capital (reflected in depreciation
charges), but also of obtaining a competitive return or better on the capi-
tal he invests. If the margin between revenue and out-of-pocket costs is
expected over a reasonable period to be large enough to cover both ex-
pected depreciation and at least a competitive return on capital, new mills
will be built and operated at capacity.
In oversimplified form, the above paragraphs outline the essence of
classical competition. With a slowly growing industry or a stable industry
with slowly improving technology, prices in any short period would be
dominated by the relation between demand and the out-of-pocket costs
of the least efficient mill which needed to be operated at capacity in order
to supply the demand at the market price. But over a longer period in
which new mills could be built, prices would be dominated by demand,
the out-of-pocket costs plus depreciation, and a competitive rate of return
on capital for the capacity operation of the most efficient mill which could
be built.
In a declining industry where the existing mills could more than
supply the demand, out-of-pocket costs of the least efficient mill needed
to fill demand would dominate prices. And in a rapidly growing industry,
appreciably more than a competitive rate of return on capital could be
expected to develop and continue for a time as new mills were being built
at an insufficient rate. But in general, prices in such a classically competi-
tive industry could be expected to gravitate around the total cost of pro-
duction at capacity of the most technically efficient mill which could be
built, including total production costs, depreciation, and a competitive
rate of return on capital.
If there were no economics of size and if each industry were operating
under conditions of classical competition, classical theory would dictate
that the resources of a society could be most effectively used in meeting
the individual wants of the society. Prices would be in line with economic
costs, individual producers would be under constant inducement to be
efficient, natural and human resources would be directed into different uses
in the fashion which would best serve the society, and capital would be
directed into different industries until each industry tended to yield a
competitive rate of return. Each individual would receive income in pro-
portion to his contribution of labor and capital.
These classical conclusions as to the results of classical competition
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have been successfully challenged on at least two major grounds: first,
that there are important economic costs which are not reflected in business
costs, such as air and water pollution; and second, that the income dis-
tribution resulting from classical competition might fall short of socially
acceptable goals. These are problems which will be taken up in the next
section of this article. For the remainder of this section, the essentials of
what can be expected if classical competition prevailed throughout the
economy will not be questioned. What will be explored is the difference
between what can be expected from a classically competitive industry as
opposed to one operating under conditions of administrative competition.
G. The Results to be Expected from Administrative Competition
In order to explore the results to be expected from administrative
competition, let us assume that there has been a big merger movement
and the 400 independent cotton spinning mills have been absorbed into
four big cotton yarn companies, each owning 100 separate mills. We can
name these four companies the American Spinning Company, the Na-
tional Spinning Company, the U.S. Spinning Company, and the Consoli-
dated Spinning Company. Competition among them will appear as follows:
First, collusion between them on prices and rates of production can be
ruled out. Such collusion might occur, but it would be illegal under the
antitrust laws, and the problem would be more vigorous prosecution un-
der the law. How could law-abiding managements be expected to act with
only four competing spinning companies?
The theories of administrative competition are not as well-developed
or tested as those of classical competition. The pioneer theories presented
by Robinson and Chamberlin stimulated theoretical discussion and clearly
established the theoretical basis for a kind of competition lying between
classical competition and monopoly. However, these theories of business
behavior have failed in important respects to conform to actual business
practice. The discrepancies are reflected in the inflexibility in administered
prices, in administrative inflation, and in the use of target pricing; none of
which are deduceable from these pioneer theories of nonclassical competi-
tion.
In considering the competitive behavior to be expected from the four
spinning companies, it will be convenient to apply certain elements of these
pioneer theories and then show specific modifications.
The pioneer theories suggest that if there were only four spinning
companies, each owning one hundred mills, the yarn prices arrived at
would be very close to monopoly prices, even if there were no collusion
or agreement between the companies. Each company could be expected
to survey demand and their own costs and arrive at a base price (with
differentials for each type of yarn) which would be the most profitable
price, if it were able to retain its proportionate share in the total market.
If, by chance, all four arrived separately at the same base price, as the
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most desirable price, this price would presumably be announced by one
and adopted by the others. In that case, it might well be the base price
that a monopoly owning all 400 mills would adopt, which presumably
would be a "monopoly" price. But the more likely development would be
one in which the four companies differed somewhat as to the most desir-
able price. Then, the more likely effect would be for the companies with
the lowest "most desirable price" to set the price for all, either initially
or later by undercutting a higher price. This also would be substantially
above a classically competitive price for mills having the same costs,
although not quite as high as those set by a monopolist with the same mills
and costs. It was recognized that sometimes price wars might break out
and rage for a period. Also, the fear of starting a price war could inhibit
price changes and thus make for inflexibility in prices. But the self-
interest of the four firms in the most profitable price was presumed
to be so great that the normal price to be expected would be close to a
monopoly price.
This pioneer theory proved to be faulty in at least four important
respects; the effect of uncertainty on pricing; the time span involved in
pricing; the effect of potential entrants; and the effect of public and
government attitudes. When modified in these respects, the theory of
administered competition takes on a substantially different and more
realistic cast but points to fundamentally different results from those to
be expected from classical competition.
Uncertainty as to the most profitable price makes for inflexibility and
arbitrariness in administrative pricing. In classical monopoly theory upon
which the pioneer theories of administrative competition are based, it is
assumed that the single seller can estimate the demand for his product
at different prices with a good deal of precision and can also estimate his
costs for different amounts of output. With this information, arrival at
the most profitable price is a matter of simple arithmetic. On this basis,
it would be expected that as demand or costs change, that most profitable
price would usually change. It was assumed that the monopolist would
adjust his price accordingly. As a result, monopoly prices would tend to
be almost as flexible in the short run as those made under conditions of
classical competition. The essential difference would be greater profit, not
inflexibility. In other words, flexibility was implicit in the pioneer theories
of administrative competition.
Yet, in practice, the monopolist cannot usually estimate the demand
for his product with precision, and there is likely to be a range of prices
which may be almost equally profitable. Thus, there is a zone in which the
monopolist is relatively indifferent to the exact price. Uncertainty as to
the most profitable price plus the existence of this zone of relative indiffer-
ence means that the initial price set by a monopolist is likely to be some-
what arbitrary. Once set, however, considerable changes in demand or
costs can take place without inducing a change in price. Furthermore, a
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moderate and arbitrary change in price can be made in the absence of any
change in demand or costs. Instead of a monopoly price being determinate
as a result of precise profit calculus, there is likely to be a considerable
degree of arbitrariness in a monopoly price. The monopolist, in pricing,
usually operates within an area of considerable discretion in which precise
market considerations do not determine the price which he sets.
This uncertainty can have the same effect in creating an area of
pricing discretion where competition is among a few producers. Assume
for example that in the textile example of four spinning companies given
earlier, that the U.S. Spinning Company is the recognized price leader. Its
management can be expected to go through a pricing calculus similar to
that of a monopolist and arrive at a relatively broad zone within which
its most profitable price is likely to lie. It will then have to consider what
price each of the other three companies will accept. It will then decide
upon and announce a price. If its analysis has been correct, each of the
other companies will find the price lying within or below its zone of
relative indifference and will accept it as its own. Occasionally, the price
leader guesses incorrectly and one of the other companies comes out with
a lower price which may be accepted by the other companies.
The large degree of pricing discretion also means that once a price
has been adopted, moderate changes in demand and costs will not provide
an inducement to price change. This, when combined with other advan-
tages of a fixed price, goes far to explain the relative inflexibility of
administered prices which the pioneer theories would not lead one to
expect.
The second modification of the pioneer theories has to do with the
time span which must be taken into account when pricing. When there
are only a few big competitors, the focus of pricing is not to make the
maximum profit in the current market. Rather, the pricing policy is
focused on long-run profit. The possibility of greater profit in the immedi-
ate future is sacrificed for greater profit over a longer period. Thus, a big
surge of demand for a particular product, which would lead to a sharp
rise in a classically competitive price, might be met by a forced-draft
operation with overtime production to supply the extra demand and no
increase or only a moderate increase in price. Similarly, a drop in demand
would be met primarily by a cut in production and employment rather
than in price.
The emphasis on long-run rather than short-run profits contributes
to the inflexibility of administered prices, but its more important effect
results from two long-run considerations which are brought into the pric-
ing calculus. The first is the danger of new entrants into the industry.
The second is the public reaction to excessive profits. Both of these can
be expected to result in prices lower than those usually expected from
short-run profit maximizing.
If we start with only four spinning companies, they share the whole
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market. Nevertheless, each must fear that other companies will build
spinning mills and take away some of the market. The price leader in
setting price can be expected to take into account the fact that too high
a level of profits on the part of four companies will soon bring new en-
trants into the industry. If this happens, future profits could be severely
curtailed. Over the years, profits of each of the four companies could be
expected to be greater if prices were set to keep current profits low enough
so that new entrants would be discouraged.
If it were perfectly easy to enter the industry, prices would have to
be set in such a manner that there would be little more than a competitive
rate of return on capital. Thus, in the spinning mill example, if the yarns
from the four companies were essentially interchangeable, entry would
presumably be easy. All that would be necessary would be to call up
Charles T. Main & Co. or one of the other textile engineering firms and
arrange for the construction of a new spinning mill. This danger would
tend to make the prices of cotton yarn set by the industry so close to
cost that the return on capital for the four companies would be close to
the competitive rate. With the same number of mills and the same costs,
the prices set by the four companies could be expected to vary less than
with the 400 separate companies but their level of prices could be expected
to be about the same as the longer period average of the classically com-
petitive prices.
Under administrative competition, the danger of new entrants be-
comes the chief instrument through which prices are kept in reasonable
relation to costs. With impossible entry, administered prices could be
expected to be close to monopoly prices. With perfectly easy entry, prices
would tend to be administered and inflexible but could be expected to
bear much the same average relation to costs as could be expected under
classical competition. Between these extremes lies a whole range of situa-
tions in which entry is more or less easy, and the pricing results lie be-
tween the longer run results of classical competition and those to be
expected from monopoly.
The difficulty of entry into an industry is partly a matter of technol-
ogy. It is difficult to imagine efficient production and classical competition
in the production of pig iron. The Chinese drive for backyard blast furn-
aces might have created enough separate enterprises to allow classical
competition but not efficiency. Only a relatively few blast furnace plants
are required to supply this country's pig iron requirements, and, even if
each plant were independently owned, the small number would not insure
classical competition.
A second impediment to entry into an industry can be created by
vertical integration. As long as the four spinning companies confined
themselves to spinning, entry could be easy. Yet, if the merger movement
had combined all cotton spinning, weaving, and finishing into four inte-
grated companies, it would be more difficult for a new company to break
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into the finished cotton cloth market. To create a new integrated company
would require more capital, a spinning mill would have difficulty finding
a market for yarn, and a weaving mill would have difficulty obtaining
yarn. If only four companies divided up the market for all textile cloth
products, a break-in would be even more difficult.
A third impediment to entry can be created through product differen-
tiation, advertising, and organization of the channels of trade. Four
integrated textile companies might, through advertising, so condition buy-
ers that only expensive advertising could allow a new company to break
into the market. Apparent differences in the details of the product, as in
the case of typewriters and automobiles, can make advertising and pro-
motion more effective. And, where exclusive dealers are used, the cost and
time required to build a new organization makes entry more difficult.
Whatever the degree of ease or difficulty in entering an administra-
tively competitive industry, the important and recognized fact is that
under conditions of administrative competition, the threat of new entry
is the major and probably the most important influence tending to limit
a serious discrepancy between actual profit rates and the competitive
cost of capital. Anything which makes entry more easy can be expected
to result in prices closer to costs plus a competitive rate of return on
capital. Conversely, anything which reduces the likelihood that new en-
tries will be stimulated by the making of more than a competitive rate of
profit can be expected to result in higher profit rates.
Whether and to what extent pricing administration is influenced by
public and government attitudes is a matter for debate. The leading com-
panies in highly concentrated industries are, to some degree, vulnerable
to public opinion. Promotion to obtain a favorable public image may not
be enough if pricing policy is antipublic. When pricing power is great,
actual pricing policy may be somewhat tempered, bringing prices some-
what closer to those yielding only a competitive return on capital.
The rigors of pricing under administrative competition have led some
progressive companies to adopt a relatively new technique in pricing which
has come to be known as "target pricing." It involves a procedure which
lies quite outside classical theory and outside the pioneer theories of ad-
ministrative competition. Instead of starting with estimates of costs and
demand, it starts with two basic estimates. The first is an estimate of how
high a rate of return on capital can be achieved without drawing new
entrants into the industry or stimulating adverse government reaction.
This would be the target rate. The second is an estimate of the average
rate of operating which reasonably can be expected over a period of years
in light of the ups and downs of demand. This would then be adopted as
the rate of operation at which the target rate of return should be earned.
Prices would then be set so that if operations were at the average rate, say
85 percent of capacity, the prices would just yield the target rate on the
capital invested. These prices would mean that if demand at the set prices
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did not reach the level necessary to operate at 85 percent of capacity, the
earning rate on capital would fall below the target rate. If demand were
higher, earnings would exceed the target rate. But over a period of years,
the target rate would be achieved.
The target rates employed in the period 1947 to 1955 are given below
for the price leader in ten major concentrated industries along with actual
returns on investment:25
Target Actual Rate of
Rate of Return After Taxes
Return 1947-1955
After Taxes Average Range
(%) (%) (%)
General Motors 20 26.0 19.9-37.0
DuPont 20 25.9 19.6-34.1
General Electric 20 21.4 18.4-26.6
Union Carbide 18 19.0 13.5-24.3
Standard Oil of N.J. - 16.0 12.0-18.9
Johns-Manville 15 14.9 10.7-19.6
Alcoa 10 13.8 7.8-18.7
International Harvester 10 8.9 4.9-11.9
United States Steel 8 10.3 7.6-14.8
Target pricing makes the prices involved relatively inflexible to
changes in demand but sensitive to changes in costs. Also, the formula for
traget pricing is more of a company guideline than a rigidly adhered to
price determinant. An unexpectedly low demand can lead to pricing
below the target price, while expectation of inflation can lead to prices
higher than current cost would prescribe.
H. Administrative Competition and Public Policy
Whether or not the device of target pricing is employed, the results to
be expected from administrative competition are significantly different
from those to be expected from classical competition, and serious prob-
lems of public policy arise.
One such problem concerns those situations in which competition is
among a few big producers and technology makes entry difficult. Both
theory and observation indicate that in such a situation, a drive to
maximize profits is likely to result in rates of return on capital well above
the competitive rates for capital. Profits would then be excessive; re-
sources, including capital, would not be used as extensively in the in-
dustry as would be economical and income distribution would be dis-
torted. What public policy should be adopted in this case?
A somewhat different problem arises when entry is presently difficult
but could be made easier. It could be expected that with difficult entry,
25. PRCnGc, supra note 22, at 240.
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the industry, in the interest of profit, would not push production to the
point required to make effective use of resources. But easier entry is
technically possible and could be expected to correct this to a greater or
lesser extent. What public policy should be adopted in this case?
I. Mergers and Concentration
Of even greater importance for future concentration is the set of
problems concerning mergers. While the Sherman Act focused on pre-
venting monopoly, the Clayton Act, as amended in 1950, outlaws mergers
which tend toward monopoly or to substantially lessen competition. Thus,
the amended Clayton Act deals with administrative competition, even
though no monopoly is in prospect. Here, the problem of mergers which
substantially lessen competition can best be discussed separately for
each of the three merger types; horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate.
1. HORIZONTAL MERGERS
A horizontal merger which had the effect of eliminating a competitor
would clearly be against public policy if there were only two competitors
to start with. The real problem presented by horizontal mergers occurs
when they will not result in a single seller. What constitutes a substantial
reduction in competition? If one wheat farmer buys out another and
operates both farms as one, there is, in some sense, a reduction in compe-
tition, but it is certainly not "substantial" as it affects the price of wheat.
However, if there are only five producers in an industry, does a merger
of two of them substantially reduce competition? If there are twenty,
would a merger of two represent a substantial reduction in competition?
Furthermore, when competition is administrative, under what conditions
would mergers not involve a substantial reduction? These are the policy
questions with respect to horizontal mergers.
2. VERTICAL MERGERS
Vertical mergers involving administrative competition raise quite a
different kind of problem. Ease of entry becomes an important objective of
public policy, and any merger which reduces potential entrants becomes a
matter of public concern. A vertical merger in which a company acquires
a company in the same stream of production, using its product or supply-
ing its raw material, can reduce the company's danger from potential
entry. It has already been indicated that entry into an integrated industry
can be more difficult than entry into the same industry without integration.
The integrating effect of a vertical merger on ease of entry is so important
that it deserves to be spelled out in more detail.
The effect of vertical integration on ease of entry can readily be seen
in the textile example. Assume an initial condition of administrative
competition between four independent spinning companies doing all the
cotton spinning, and assume all cotton weaving is done by four indepen-
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dent weaving companies. If yarn prices are kept too high, i.e., if the profits
of the yarn companies are substantially above a competitive return on
capital, one of the four weaving companies, seeking lower yarn prices, can
be expected to threaten to set up its own spinning mills. This threat could
serve to keep yarn prices in fairly reasonable relation to costs, even though
none of the weaving companies actually built spinning mills. Also, the
threat would presumably be much more effective than the possibility of an
outside company coming into the spinning business. The latter would
also have to "break into the market" for yarns, while the weaving com-
pany would have no such problem.
Similarly, if the prices arrived at for cotton cloth by the interaction
of the four weaving companies resulted in excessive rates of return on
capital, it would presumably be much easier for one of the four spinning
companies to build weaving plants than it would be for an outsider to do
SO.
Furthermore, it is reasonable to suppose that if there were four in-
tegrated companies, each starting with raw cotton and ending with
finished cotton cloth, it would be much more difficult for an outsider to
enter the industry than if there were four spinning companies, four
weaving companies, and four finishing companies.
Thus, under administrative competition, vertical integration can sub-
stantially reduce the threat of entry and allow an increase in the margin
between prices and costs. As a result, one can be reasonably sure that, if
the price leader among the four independent spinning mills adopted the
target pricing procedure, it would adopt a lower rate of return as its target
in pricing than would the price leader among the four integrated com-
panies.
Of course, there are other considerations involved in dealing with
vertical mergers, such as the financial power of size and the withdrawal of
potential markets from other producers. But the competitive pressure of
potential entrants is so important for administrative competition that it
presents a major problem of public policy where vertical mergers are
concerned. In the presence of administrative competition, vertical mergers
can reduce the likelihood that prices will be kept reasonably in line with
costs. Thus, they operate to reduce competition. The main problem is to
draw the line between cases of vertical integration which substantially
lessen competition and those which do not.
3. CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
In 1927, duPont acquired a substantial block of U.S. Steel Corpora-
tion stock and became one of its largest stockholders. It already held
nearly 23 percent of the stock of General Motors which gave it working
control of the latter. The antitrust agencies were critical of this acquisition
and in 1928 duPont informed the government that it had disposed of its
steel stock. Subsequently, the courts forced it to dispose of its holdings
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in General Motors. If the three companies, leaders in chemicals, automo-
biles and steel, had come under common legal control the result would
have been a conglomerate. The latter could be defined as a combination
of companies whose primary activities make the combination neither a
horizontal nor a vertical combination. This does not mean that there
may not be some measure of horizontal or vertical relation between the
combining companies but only that this relation is not the dominant re-
lation. Whereas a cotton yarn mill and a weaving mill are obviously in a
single line of production, a steel company, such as U.S. Steel, and an auto
company only partially overlap. Much of the steel goes to other industries
and much of the raw material or parts for autos come from other than
steel companies. Practically all large conglomerates involve some degree
of overlap, either with some competition between the separate companies
or with some buying and selling between them. To this extent, the princi-
ples of horizontal or vertical merging apply. The major policy problems
are as follows: whether the merging will substantially reduce competition
between constituent units and whether it makes entry into the industries
of the constituents substantially more difficult?
A conglomerate can and usually does involve other substantial prob-
lems affecting competition. If the conglomerate only acquired enterprises
which were engaged in classically competitive industries, it is difficult to
see what problems of public policy would arise. For example, if the United
Farm Corporation acquired a wheat farm in the south, a corn-hog farm
in Iowa, a tobacco farm in Virginia and a cattle farm in Texas, classical
competition in the pricing of the various products could be expected to
continue. But the usual conglomerate acquisition is operating not only
under conditions of administrative competition but also under conditions
of difficult entry. The conglomerate promoters will seldom see potential
extra profit in acquiring a company operating in an industry in which
entry is quite easy. Such companies do not fit into the conglomerate
syndrome. Thus, the main problems arising from conglomerates concern
a combination of administrative competition and difficult entry.
The wave of conglomerate mergers is relatively new, and neither the
actual behavior of conglomerates nor theoretical analysis has brought sub-
stantial agreement as to their effects on competition.
Claims are regularly made that conglomerate management can raise
the efficiency of the combined companies by bringing to bear financial
resources and superior central management skills which the separate com-
panies do not possess. However, it is also pointed out that the problems of
management become more complex with the possibility of decreased effi-
ciency. The experience of large conglomerates would appear to be mixed,
with some of them having serious management difficulties. Unfortunately,
the financial reports of most conglomerates do not allow a before-and-
after comparison of operations. Revising accounting procedures, reshuf-
fling underlying properties, and consolidating accounts make it impossible
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even to compare before-and-after profits and to distinguish between
profits arising from changes in accounting, profits from inflation, and
profits from improved management. Even if there were profits from im-
proved management and the figures were available, there would still be
the problem of distinguishing between profits from increased efficiency
and profits from increased market power.
Until there is substantial evidence to the contrary, there is good
reason to be skeptical of the claims of increased efficiency alleged to re-
sult from bringing under one central control, the operations of diverse
separate companies which usually make up a big conglomerate. Many of
the management skills which a central conglomerate management is
supposed to supply could be obtained by the constituent companies from
independent management consulting firms. Furthermore, the proposition
that the new financing provided by the conglomerate is cheaper than that
which the constituent companies could obtain has yet to be firmly es-
tablished.
There is substantial agreement, though, that a conglomerate has
opportunities to increase short-run profits through tax and accounting
procedures not open to the separate companies. If a conglomerate acquires
a company by exchanging bonds for outstanding stock, income taxes are
saved on earnings paid out as interest, an action not open to an individual
company. There may be opportunities for setting losses off against gains.
Profits can be temporarily increased by altering depreciation policies, and
in other ways profits may be increased for a time without any change in
operating efficiency.
There also seems to be agreement that a two-billion dollar conglom-
erate has greater financial and market power than the separate companies
which it has taken over. Though just how much greater power is in-
volved and how it affects competition has not been definitely ascertained.
Part of the market power of a big conglomerate comes from its
ability to finance losses in one activity from earnings in others. This
ability can distort the workings of competition in at least two different
ways. It allows the conglomerate to carry on nonprice rivalry through
advertising, sales effort, model changes, services to buyers, and similar
means so that sales go to the conglomerate because of its financial re-
sources and not because of lower costs. This type of rivalry tends to in-
crease industry costs and result in higher prices and less efficient use of
resources. In a particular market, a conglomerate can carry on de-
structive price competition or take other measures to damage a rival
with the knowledge that the rival is likely to be hurt more than the
conglomerate. Although, in the short-run, this may benefit customers, in
the longer run, a weakening of the rival may result in higher prices.
Even if neither of these actions were taken, the mere existence of the
power to take them could be expected to reduce competition. The other
enterprises in the particular industry would know that these actions
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could be taken and would be less willing to initiate competitive moves
which they would otherwise employ to intensify competition. Likewise,
potential entrants into the industry would be less willing to enter the
industry when they know that one of the few companies in the industry
was controlled by a conglomerate with its considerable market power.
This could significantly increase the difficulty of entry.
A merger of a company in a concentrated industry into a big con-
glomerate could also affect competition quite apart from the conglom-
erate's market power. The conglomerate, without merging a company
already operating in the industry, is itself a potential entrant into the
industry. If it had to build its own new plants to enter, competition would
be strengthened. The merger would eliminate this potential entrant.
Finally, if there were two conglomerates, each carrying on activity
in a number of the same markets, competition is likely to be lessened.
If Conglomerate A is competing with Conglomerate B in both the market
for gadgets and for widgets, it might forbear to push competition in the
market for gadgets because of the danger of retaliation in the widget
market. The more markets served by conglomerates, the greater this
competitive forbearance is likely to become.
The ways in which a conglomerate merger can reduce competition
raise two major questions of policy. In appraising a conglomerate take-
over of a company from the point of view of the public interest, how
should the various ways in which competition is likely to be reduced be
weighed in deciding whether there is likely to be a "substantial reduc-
tion of competition?" If there were a small amount of horizontal compe-
tition between the merged company and one or more of the conglomerates
plus other activities and some cross-buying between it and them, so that
the merger involved an element of vertical integration, and additionally,
if each of the other ways that the merger would affect competition was
small although the aggregate of these was large, would the merger involve
a "substantial reduction" in competition? Or would the reduction have
to be substantial in at least one of the ways discussed? And to what
extent, if any, should the anti-trust laws be modified to deal with the prob-
lems raised by conglomerate mergers?
J. The Larger Problem of Competition
There still remains the question of the extent to which such adminis-
trative competition under the antitrust laws can be expected to keep
prices in reasonable relation to cost. Present-day theory suggests that in
industries lacking easy entry, profits are likely to average appreciably
higher than a competitive rate. The statistical evidence also suggests that
this is the case. Income tax statistics show a higher average rate of return
on capital for large companies than for medium or small companies, and
presumably this is true for the more concentrated industries than for the
less. If this is the case, then the level of present-day competition must be
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falling short of maintaining prices in a reasonable relation to business
costs. To this extent, resources are not being channeled into the most
effective use, and income distribution is to this extent distorted. This
presents a real problem. When concentrated enterprise operates under
conditions of administrative competition, can it be expected that the
market and competition alone can ensure business operation in such a
way that within the limits of business costs and business activity resources
are effectively used and incomes fairly distributed? This is what classical
competition was supposed to bring about.
Since this article is concerned with corporate concentration, little
attention has been given to labor organization and its effect on prices
and the distribution of income. This could be the subject of a separate
article. In this regard, only three things need to be said. First, when an
industry makes more than a competitive rate of return on capital, this can
be expected to make labor relations more difficult. Second, under con-
ditions of administrative competition and difficult entry, labor pressure
for higher wages is not likely to eliminate a discrepancy between prices
and a competitive rate of return. Instead, increases in wage rates in excess
of increased productivity are likely to increase costs which will be made
the basis of price increase. Third, fairness of wages as between different
industries and the direction of resources into different uses will each de-
pend in part on the extent that labor organizations work to bring about
such fairness.
None of these propositions alter the analysis of the effect of corporate
concentration on competition, on the use of resources, and on income
distribution but they do highlight the importance of labor concentration to
the use of resources and the distribution of income.
IV. CORPORATE CONCENTRATION AND A WAY OF LIFE
In the preceding text, attention has been focused on the problems
created by corporate concentration within the general framework of a
business economy. Attention will now be focused on the society and the
problems of the good life that concentration and the corporation have
generated which lie outside the scope of a business economy but which
relate to it. Only four of these problems will briefly be touched on here:
the discrepancy between business costs and social costs; the distribution
of income in a good society; living with the big corporations; and the
political role of the big corporations.
A. Business Costs vs. Social Costs
It has long been recognized that there can be a serious discrepancy
between business costs and social costs. The factory inspection laws have
reduced the social cost of factory operation which was not included in
business costs, and the compensation acts have made a social cost into a
business cost. The current concern with pollution is leading to similar
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action, either to eliminate a social cost or to convert it into a business
cost. The intermittent or irregular employment of workers has in part
been converted into a business cost through unemployment insurance
but it is still carried to an important extent by individuals. Social costs
not now included in business costs present a real problem in the use of re-
sources. To the extent that these social costs can be eliminated, there is
a solution, but to the extent that they are converted into business costs,
resources can be expected to be directed by business into different uses in
relation to social as well as business costs. In some cases, the discrepancy
between social and business costs may be more effectively handled by
charging it directly to the government, as in the case of education.
This discrepancy between social and business costs has always
existed, but the success of big corporate enterprise in creating an affluent
society has heightened the problem: it has made the measures to eliminate
social costs or to convert them into business cost no longer a luxury but a
necessity for the good life. The problem is to determine what these un-
covered social costs are and to determine how they should be handled and
who should pay for or suffer them.
B. The Distribution of Income
The concentrated economy presents three types of income distribu-
tion problems. The first problem arises from discrepancies between corpo-
rate earnings and the competitive rate of return on capital where
competition is administrative and entry is difficult. This has already been
discussed. It presents a real problem of how corporate earnings can be
kept in reasonable relation to costs.
The second income problem evolves from other imperfections in the
working of the system as the concentrated economy fails to make the
adjustments which were to be expected in an economy of classical com-
petition. In the classical economy of atomistic enterprise, involuntary
unemployment was expected to be of such short duration that there was
no great hardship on individuals, and those employed were expected to
receive income in proportion to the value of their contribution. However,
in a concentrated economy operating under conditions of administrative
competition, there can be substantial discrepancies between reward and
potential contribution, which are only partly alleviated by social security
programs. In this area, the problem is complex. It is partly a matter of
organization, partly one of fitting jobs to people, and partly one of fitting
people to jobs. The unemployment of two million persons willing and
capable of working is the equivalent of throwing away approximately ten
billion dollars of income.
The third problem of income distribution concerns those individuals
unable to make a substantial contribution and to obtain a substantial in-
come under the concentrated-economy system of production. This in-
cludes not only "the lame, the halt and the blind" of traditional analysis
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but the psychological misfits that the system rejects or for which it does
not make a place. It also includes those who are only capable of low
productivity. Again, social security programs deal with this problem to
some degree. Since the affluence arising from the concentrated economy
makes the establishment of a minimum level of incomes not only feasible
but almost mandatory, the central problem here is how and at what level
this can most effectively be done.
C. Corporate Concentration and the Good Life
Economists used to treat labor as a commodity and analyze the role
of a worker in the economy much as they would analyze the role of a sack
of wheat or a bale of cotton as a raw material input in the production
of output. Today, working for a big corporation has become a way of
life for a large proportion of workers. Apart from sleeping and eating,
nearly half of a worker's time is likely to be spent at the job or going to
and from it. The affluent society, therefore, must reflect that affluence in
the conditions surrounding the work. Labor unions have pushed for better
working conditions and corporations have contributed to better con-
ditions. But the rise in affluence has altered the magnitude of the problem.
The good life is a problem during working hours as well as outside them.
D. Corporate Concentration and Government
Corporate concentration has also posed a major problem in the re-
lationship of government to business. As long as production was carried on
by relatively small business, political theory could be built on the as-
sumption of an atomistic electorate. Pressures from constituents on elected
representatives and public officials which, though individually biased,
would in the aggregate serve to guide them toward the public interest.
Concentration of much production into the hands of a relatively few
giant corporations conflicts with the assumptions of traditional political
theory and presents a set of problems which have been recognized but are
far from being thought through or dealt with adequately. Such measures
as those which prevent corporate contributions to political parties and
which require registration of corporate lobbyists are moves in that direc-
tion. But the power of corporations on government far exceeds the bounds
suggested by these measures. To some extent, it is offset by the pressures
from labor organizations and other organized groups. But it still repre-
sents a major pressure. The problem is to determine the ramifications of
this pressure and to develop the balances which will result in government
in the public interest.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has sought to appraise the degree of corporate concen-
tration and the major problems of public policy which this concentration
has engendered. It has examined the changes brought about by concentra-
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tion for the economy as a whole and the problems this has created in the
economy-wide policies with respect to total employment, inflation, and
the balance of external payments. It has examined the changes in the
dominant form of competition and the major problems these have created
with respect to the use of resources and the distribution of income. It
has sketched other major problems arising from corporate concentration
or associated with it, but lying outside the areas of overall economic policy
and competition. Any effort of an individual to classify major and minor
problems is necessarily subjective. Others attempting the same task
would undoubtedly include other problems as major and exclude some
the author has included, or would state them differently, or would find a
different relation between the problems and corporate concentration. In
any event, although it is important to clarify the major problems of public
policy created by corporate concentration, an even more important task
is to find solutions.
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